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Senator Orrin Hatch's introduction of the "Induce Act"' in the
summer of 2004 transformed the ongoing debate over the legality,
morality, and economics of peer-to-peer file sharing into a debate
over Sony v. Universal Studios,2 at least among the copyright cogno-
Portions of this paper are adapted from a chapter on the history and impact of the Sony
opinion to be published in JANE C. GINSBURG AND ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW STORIES (forthcoming 2005).
* I'm grateful to Jon Weinberg, Jane Ginsburg. Rochelle Dreyfuss, Cory Streiseinger,
Fred von Lohmann, Julie Cohen, and Stacey Dogan for their very helpful suggestions and com-
ments.
Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004). The
Bill would have made anyone who "aids, abets, induces, or procures" infringement liable as an
infringer if a reasonable person, looking at all available information including whether the
aiding, abetting, inducing or procuring "activity relies on infringement for its commercial viabil-
ity" would infer that actor intended to aid, abet, induce or procure infringement.
2 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984). See, e.g.,
Xeni Jardin, Induce Act Draws Support, Venom, WIRED NEWS (Aug. 26, 2004) at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,64723,00.html.
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scenti. Fans of the Sony decision insist that the legal rule announced
in the case made the world safe for innovation.3 The Sony standard,
they tell us, is "the only thing that protects your right to own a VCR,
tape recorder, CD-burner, DVD-burner, iPod, or TiVo. It's that im-
portant. '4 Sony, they claim, has for twenty years shielded innovators
from copyright infringement suits and enabled the rapid technological
advances that permit us to enjoy an unparalleled wealth of media.5
Sony's detractors read the decision more narrowly.6 If consumers
have some "right" to own or use a VCR, tape-recorder, CD-burner,
DVD-burner, iPod, or TiVo, they continue, that right certainly doesn't
emanate from Sony, which recognized a limited consumer privilege to
make temporary analog tapes of free broadcast television programs,
and declined to hold the maker of a copying machine liable where the
machine was used primarily to make those temporary tapes.7 Thus,
when the Ninth Circuit concluded that Sony precluded finding the
distributors of Grokster and Morpheus software liable as contributory
infringers, because the software was capable of substantial, commer-
3 See., Protecting Innovation and Art While Preventing Piracy, Hearing Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (July 22, 2004) (testimony of Gary Shapiro, Consumer
Electronics Association) ("We have long referred to this holding as the Magna Carta for our
industry."), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1276. See also id. (testi-
mony of Kevin McGuiness, NetCoaltion) (Sony "has been one of the cornerstones of the growth
of the Internet, because it strikes a reasonable balance between the interest of copyright holders
and the technical realities of the online world"); Letter from 42 organizations to Senator Orrin
Hatch, July 6, 2004, at http://www.netcoalition.comvertical/Sites/%7BFID948CC-5797-482E-
B502-743C873E2848%7D/uploads/%7B86458E75-3C54-4BEO-A5D3-
7D67D28DBFC3%7D.DOC (The Sony standard "has given venture capitalists, engineers, and
manufacturers the confidence and certainty that they could invest their resources in developing a
wide range of consumer products without facing copyright liability"); Downhill Battle, Save
Betamax Day, at http://www.savebetamax.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2005) ("the freedom to use
and develop new technology that was protected by the Betamax decision set the stage for the
incredible growth in computer technology we've seen in the last few decades.").
I Downhill Battle, Save Betamax Day, at http://www.savebetamax.org.
5 See, e.g., Brief of Digital Media Ass'n et. al as Amici Curiae, at 4-5, MGM v. Grokster,
259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (filed Jan. 24, 2004).
6 See, e.g., Brief for Appellants at 40-48, A & M v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001); Reply Comments of the Recording Industry Association of America, In the Matter of
Digital Audio Broadcasting Systems and Their Impact on Terrestial Audio Broadcast Services,
MM Docket No. 99-325 (filed August 2, 2004); Electronic Frontier Foundation, Endangered
Gizmos, at http://www.eff.org/endangered/; Theodore D. Frank, Letter to Marlene H. Dortch,
Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of Digital Audio Broadcasting Systems
and Their Impact on Terrestial Audio Broadcast Services (February 7, 2004), at 2 ("the Sony
decision only authorized certain recording for time shifting"); see also 2004 Senate Hearing,
supra note 4 (testimony of Kevin McGuiness, NetCoaltion) ("Moreover, it is unclear whether
the entertainment industry is willing to acknowledge that the Supreme Courts ruling applies to
anything other than Sony Betamaxes.").
7 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control Over New Technologies of Dissemi-
nation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1624, & n. 45 (2001); Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copy-
right) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 217, 250.
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cially significant non-infringing uses,8 copyright owners labeled that a
gross misreading of Sony.9 The Register of Copyrights complained
that the decision "threatens to dramatically undermine the effective-
ness of copyright in the digital age."'
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Grokster case in part to re-
solve the dispute about the meaning and scope of Sony in a networked
digital age." The Court will almost certainly revisit its holding in
Sony in the course of deciding Grokster. That has inspired hyperbolic
pronouncements from all sides about the importance of the case. If
the Supreme Court gets it wrong, we hear, either innovation will be
stymied or the copyright law will be eviscerated.'
2
We've all become too accustomed to feverish overstatements in
the course of the continuing copyright wars. It becomes easy to for-
get that some things we say are exaggerations amplified for rhetorical
effect. If we're looking seriously at Sony, we should examine the
claim that the case functions as the high tech industries' Magna
Carta.13 Did the Supreme Court intend to craft a shield for innovators
or was it merely seeking a plausible rationale to exonerate a manufac-
turer of a particular, popular product? Has the Sony decision really
protected innovators from lawsuits?
I'm as fond as anyone of what I read the Sony decision to hold, but
I think that some of the familiar claims for its effectiveness as a shield
for innovation are difficult to support. While lawyers representing the
producers of tape recorders, MP3 players, digital video recorders, or
Internet search engines may have read Sony to protect their clients
from liability, the lawyers representing the recording and motion pic-
ture industries read the case more narrowly. 14 When new devices hit
the market, they attracted lawsuits.' 5 While the shadow of the Sony
8 See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125
S.Ct. 686 (2004).
9 See., e.,g., Brief for Motion Picture Studio and recording Company Petitioners, MGM
v. Grokster, No. 04-480 (filed January 24, 2005), at 2, 17.
'0 See Mary Beth Peters, Copyright Enters the Public Domain, The 33d Donald C. Brace
Memorial Lecture, 51 J. COPYR. Soc'Y 701,724 (2004).
1 See Petition for Certiorari, MGM v. Grokster, No. 04-480.
12 See, e.g., Amici Curiae Brief of the Computer and Communications Industry Associa-
tion et. al. in opposition to Petition for Certiorari, MGM v. Grokster, No. 04-480 (filed Novem-
ber 8, 2004), at 2; see also Brief for Motion Picture Studio and Recording Industry Petitioners,
MGM v. Grokster, No. 04-480 at 50.
13 See Roger Parloff, The Real War Over Piracy: From Betamax to Kazaa, A legal battle
is raging over the "Magna Carta of the Technology Age," FORTUNE MAGAZINE, October 27,
2003, at 148.
14 See, e.g., Reply Comments of the Recording Industry Association of America, In the
Matter of Digital Audio Broadcasting Systems and Their Impact on Terrestial Audio Broadcast
Services, MM Docket No. 99-325 (filed August 2, 2004).
15 See RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia, 29 F. Supp. 2d 624 (C.D. Cal. 1998), affd 180 F.3d
1072, (9th Cir. 1999); MPAA v. Replay TV, Civ. No. 01-09801 (C.D. Cal. filed November 14,
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opinion probably influenced the settlement negotiations where there
were settlement negotiations, 6 it was not so large a shadow that it
was able to protect defendant innovators from running out of money
before they could invoke a defense based on Sony at trial.1
7
Those of us who worry about how our favorite language from Sony
will fare in the Grokster decision are worried at least in part because
we fear that the best parts of Sony might have made their way into the
opinion by some judicial accident; given a second chance, a more
careful Court might take those parts back. Sony's detractors seem
persuaded of that, too.' 8 It's worth taking some time to examine the
historical materials that have become available in the 21 years since
the Sony decision, to see what persuaded the Court to resolve the case
the way it did. The Supreme Court files of Justice William Brennan,
Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice Harry Blackmun (who wrote
the first draft of a majority opinion and ended up turning it into a dis-
sent) are available for review in the Library of Congress, and they
provide some insight into the Court's deliberations.
An examination of the Justices' files on Sony reveals that at least
some of the Justices in the majority were concerned about copyright
law's impact on innovators. The Justices hoped to craft a rule that
would give copyright owners meaningful protection, without empow-
ering them to squash any emerging technology that threatened their
ways of doing business. The process of writing an opinion that would
secure a majority of votes, however, resulted in a final product con-
taining a hodge-podge of rationales. The many different reasons the
Court listed in support of its result encouraged sharp disagreement
among copyright lawyers about what Sony had in fact held. That dis-
agreement may have fueled rather than dampened efforts to litigate
new technologies into bankruptcy. A revisited Sony may abandon
principles that we think are important, but it may also end up offering
2001); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. RecordTV, NO. (C.D.Cal.), filed June 15, 2000; Twentieth
Century Fox Film, Inc. v. Scour, Inc., No. 00 Civ , (S.D.N.Y.) filed July 20, 2000; Cahn v.
Sony, No. 90 Civ. 4537 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 9, 1990).
16 See, e.g., Gary S. Lutzker, Note, DAT's All Folks: Cahn v. Sony and the Audio Home
Recording Act of 1991 - Merrie Melodies or Looney Tunes?, II CARDOZO ARTS & ENTER. L.J.
145 (1992).
17 See Dawn C. Chmielewski, ReplayTV seeks to soothe relations with entertainment in-
dustry, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 18, 2003 ("But the case never got its day in court. It
was put on pause in March, when SonicBlue filed for bankruptcy."); Roger Parloff, Killer App:
Thanks to its ballyhooed Napster alliance, Bertelsmann faces more than $ 17 billion in copy-
right lawsuits. Now that's a real killer app., FORTUNE, Sept. 2003, at Ill ("Because Napster
went bankrupt, its legal status was never finally resolved.").




emerging technology a more reliable shield than Sony has been able
to supply.
Part I of this paper recounts the historical background surrounding
the introduction of the Betamax video tape recorder, the filing of the
lawsuit, and the progress of the case in the lower courts. In Part II,
working from internal Court memoranda and unpublished drafts of
the majority and dissenting opinions, I explore the Supreme Court's
treatment of the case. In Part III, I suggest some conclusions sup-
ported by the historical materials as to what the Justices had in mind.
In Part IV, I discuss the influence of the Sony decision on subsequent
copyright law. In Part V, I challenge the claim that Sony has served
as an effective shield for innovation, and speculate on what aspects of
Sony are most at risk as the Court prepares to decide Grokster.
I. BACKGROUND
In the fall of 1975, when the first Sony Betamax appeared in
stores, the American public had already become used to personal
copying technology. The photocopy machine, invented in 1937 and
sold commercially since 1950, was a common piece of equipment in
business offices and libraries.19 Copyshops had sprung up in the mid-
1960s. Consumer audio cassette recorders, first marketed in 1963,
had become ubiquitous.20 The telephone answering machine, intro-
duced by Phonemate in 1971, had become increasingly familiar, and
telefacsimile machines were making inroads in the U.S. market. Be-
fore the Sony Betamax, several manufacturers had introduced con-
sumer home video devices, but all of them had flopped.2'
A number of U.S. companies expected that the next big thing
would be laser disc video playback-only devices. MCA, owner of
Universal Studios, had invested heavily in a format it called DiscoVi-
sion. RCA (then-owner of NBC) was working on its own laser disc
system, named SelectaVision. Magnavox was trying to perfect Mag-
navision. None of these systems was ready for the market, and none
of them was compatible with the others. The appearance of a home
video tape recorder threatened the potential market for laser disc de-
ll In Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S., 487 F.2d 1345, affirmed by an equally divided
Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975), medical publishers sued the National Library of Medicine for
massive photocopying of medical journal articles for the benefit of medical researchers. Justice
Blackmun recused himself from the case because of his earlier relationship with the Mayo
clinic, and the remaining Justices divided 4 to 4 on whether the photocopying was fair use or
copyright infringement.
20 See Video Interchange, Vintage Audio History, at
http://www.videointerchange.com/audio-history.htm (last visited March 11, 2005).
21 See JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD 60-81 (2002); see also NICK LYONS, THE SONY
VISION 202-15 (1976).
2005]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
vices: would consumers purchase playback-only machines if they
could instead buy machines that could both play and record?
22
The first Betamax introduced in the U.S. was a combination televi-
sion-video-tape-recorder that cost more than two thousand dollars.
Several months later, Sony introduced the Betamax SL-7300, a stand-
alone video tape recorder with a list price of $1300 (about $4300 in
today's dollars). By the time of trial, the price of a Sony Betamax
had. dropped to $875, equivalent to about $2300 in 2004 dollars.
Notwithstanding the steep price, consumers bought it. Sony sup-
ported its product launch with a series of commercials and print ads
touting the opportunity to watch two shows that were being broadcast
at the same time. "We've all been in the situation where there are two
TV programs on opposite each other and we'd give any thing to be
able to see both of them. Well now you can see both of them," began
one ad.23 "Sony Betamax videocassette recorder, destined to be a
superstar in your home entertainment scene: even if you're not there,
it records TV programs you don't want to miss, builds a priceless
videotape library in no time," claimed another.24
Journalist James Lardner, the author of Fast Forward, the defini-
tive book on the history of the Sony case, begins his book with the
story of an ad that Sony's ad agency, Doyle Dane Bernbach, con-
ceived and sent to Universal Studios for its approval. "Now you
don't have to miss Kojak because you're watching Columbo (or vice
versa). 25 Kojak and Columbo were two of Universal's most popular
shows, and the ad agency figured that the studio would be delighted
that American audiences would be able to watch both of them. Sid-
ney Sheinberg, the president of Universal, wasn't delighted. Indeed,
Lardner reports, Sheinberg believed such a device usurped movie
studio prerogatives; he didn't think that a home video tape recorder
should be marketed at all. He consulted Universal's lawyers, who
agreed that marketing a device that copied television programs
seemed to violate Universal's exclusive right to reproduce its works
under section 106(1) of the 1976 Copyright Act. In a meeting the
following week between Sheinberg and Akio Morita, the chairman of
Sony, to discuss the possibility that Sony would manufacture Dis-
22 See LARDNER, supra note 21, at 12-13; Robert Lindsay, Monumental Legal Battle
Shaping Up in Bid to Bar Color TV Recorders, N.Y. TIMES, March 25, 1977 at 77; Edwin
McDiwell, Home Video Systems Still Seek Success on Market, N.Y. TIMES, March 21, 1978, at
71.
23 Sony Betamax display ad, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1975, at 19.
24 Macy's Sony Betamax display ad, N.Y. TIMES, March 30, 1976, at 13.
25 LARDNER, supra note 21, at 5-6.
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coVision players for MCA, Sheinberg insisted that Sony withdraw the
Betamax from the market or face a copyright infringement suit.26
Universal's lawyers sent a private investigator to consumer elec-
tronics stores to pose as a customer and catch sales clerks making
recordings of Universal programs. Meanwhile, they recruited one of
their other clients, William Griffiths, to be a nominal individual de-
fendant. They were concerned that a court might refuse to impose
liability on Sony unless they were able to show that a Betamax owner
had used the device to make infringing copies. Griffiths owned a
Betamax. Universal's lawyers asked him to agree to be sued; Univer-
sal would promise, they explained, to seek no damages from him in
the event it prevailed in the lawsuit. Meanwhile, Universal spoke
with other studios in search of co-plaintiffs. Disney agreed to join the
suit. Warner Brothers didn't want to be a named plaintiff, but was
willing to contribute money towards legal costs. 27
On November 11, 1976, Universal and Disney filed suit against
the Sony Corporation, Sony's American subsidiary, Sony's advertis-
ing agency, five dealers in consumer electronics, and Mr. Griffiths. 28
Griffiths would later testify that he had purchased his Betamax plan-
ning to create a library of taped TV shows, but that the expense of
blank tapes had persuaded him that it made more sense to watch taped
programs and then tape over them.29
A. The Sony Trial
The trial began in January of 1979 and lasted for five weeks. The
studios presented evidence tending to show that consumers were re-
cording shows to keep in their video libraries. When Gone with the
Wind was broadcast, one witness testified, stores across the U.S. sold
out of blank videocassettes. The chairman of Walt Disney testified
that the company had declined lucrative contracts to show The Jungle
Book and Mary Poppins on television because they feared that con-
sumers might tape the showings. Sony's lawyer countered with evi-
dence showing that some copyright owners had no objection to home
taping. The studios sought, unsuccessfully, to present evidence that
Sony could have redesigned the Betamax by installing a jammer to
prevent recording unless the copyright holder assented, at a cost of
about $15 per machine.3 °
26 LARDNER, supra note 21, at 13.
27 See id. at 15-19.
28 See id. at 19.29 See Universal City Studios v. Sony, 480 F. Supp. 429, 436-37 (C. D. Cal. 1979), rev'd,
659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
30 See LARDNER, supra note 21, at 97-106; Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 436-40.
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Judge Ferguson's opinion, handed down on October 2, absolved
Sony of liability. The copyright law, Judge Ferguson held, did not
give copyright holders "a monopoly power over an individual's off-
the-air copying in his home for private non-commercial use."'" First,
the court concluded, Congress could not have meant the courts to
interpret absolutely literally the statutory language giving copyright
owners the exclusive right to reproduce their works. Although legis-
lative history accompanying the addition of sound recordings to the
list of works entitled to copyright demonstrated that Congress had not
intended to prohibit non-commercial home audio-taping, the statute
contained no language expressly exempting it. By the same token,
the judge concluded, Congress had not intended to give copyright
owners the right to prohibit home video recording. "Congress did not
find that protection of copyright holders' rights over reproduction of
their works was worth the privacy and enforcement problems which
restraint of home-use recording would create., 32 Even if home video
recording were deemed an infringement of copyright, it was sheltered
by the fair use privilege. Most consumers, the Judge found, used their
videotape recorders to "time-shift" programming-to tape a show in
order to watch it at a more convenient time and then record over the
tape.
Betamax owners use plaintiffs' works noncommercially and
privately. This use increases the owners' access to material
voluntarily broadcast to them free of charge over public air-
waves. Because the use occurs within private homes, en-
forcement of a prohibition would be highly intrusive and
practically impossible. Such intrusion is particularly unwar-
ranted when plaintiffs themselves choose to beam their pro-
grams into these homes.33
Further, even if the Copyright Act prohibited home copying, the de-
fendants should not be liable for the copies made by consumers.
Judge Ferguson drew an analogy from patent law, where manufactur-
ers of staple articles of commerce were not held liable for infringe-
ment merely because they supplied devices that could be used in in-
fringing ways. 34 Video tape recorders, like audio tape recorders, cam-
eras, typewriters, and photocopy machines, were staple articles of
31 Id. at 432.
32 Id. at 446.
33 Id. at 454.




commerce with infringing as well as noninfringing uses. Expanding
the boundaries of liability to extend to manufacturers of staple articles
would put an intolerable burden on commerce.35 Judge Ferguson
noted more than once that plaintiffs conceded that they had not yet
suffered harm from the Betamax, and that they had failed to show that
they would likely suffer harm in the future:
The new technology of videotape recording does bring uncer-
tainty and change which, quite naturally, induce fear. His-
tory, however, shows that this fear may be
misplaced .... Television production by plaintiffs today is
more profitable than it has ever been, and, in five weeks of
trial, there was no concrete evidence to suggest that the Be-
tamax will change the studios' financial picture.36
B. Appeal to the Ninth Circuit
Universal appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and a unanimous panel
reversed. 37 The court rejected Judge Ferguson's conclusion that Con-
gress might have meant to protect consumers from liability for home
taping but had failed to say so explicitly:
The statutory framework is unambiguous; the grant of exclu-
sive rights is only limited by the statutory exceptions. Ele-
mentary principles of statutory construction would indicate
that the judiciary should not disturb this carefully constructed
statutory scheme in the absence of compelling reasons to do
so. That is, we should not, absent a clear direction from Con-
gress, disrupt this framework by carving out exceptions to the
broad grant of rights apart from those in the statute itself.38
The court held that consumers who copied television programs off the
air for private noncommercial use infringed the copyrights in those
programs, and that Sony, its U.S. subsidiary, its advertising agency
and the retail store defendants were liable as contributory infringers.
Judge Kilkenny's opinion dismissed the lower court's staple article of
,,39commerce theory as "inappropriate. Videotape recorders were not
staple articles because they were were not suitable for noninfringing
use:
35 Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 461.
36 Id. at 469.
37 Sony, 659 F.2d at 963.
38 Id. at 966.
39 Id. at 975.
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Appellees' analogy of videotape records to cameras or photo-
copying machines may have substantial benefit for some pur-
poses, but does not even remotely raise copyright problems.
Videotape recorders are manufactured, advertised, and sold
for the primary purpose of reproducing television program-
ming. Virtually all television programming is copyrighted
material. Therefore, videotape recorders are not "suitable for
substantial noninfringing use." . . . That some copyright own-
ers choose, for one reason or another, not to enforce their
rights does not preclude those who legitimately choose to do
so from protecting theirs.40
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to fashion a
suitable remedy, noting:
The relief question is exceedingly complex, and the difficulty
in fashioning relief may well have influenced the district
court's evaluation of the liability issue. The difficulty of fash-
ioning relief cannot, however, dissuade the federal courts
from affording appropriate relief to those whose rights have
been infringed....
In fashioning relief, the district court should not be overly
concerned with the prospective harm to appellees. A defen-
dant has no right to expect a return on investment from activi-
ties which violate the copyright laws. Once a determination
has been made that an infringement is involved, the continued
profitability of appellees' businesses is of secondary con-41
cern.
C. Congress Gets Involved
The following day, members of Congress introduced legislation in
both the House and the Senate to legalize home video recording.42
Other representatives weighed in with variant bills, and on April 12,
1982, the House Committee on the Judiciary held a special hearing in
Los Angeles to consider the six different bills before it. The motion
40 Id. (footnote omitted).
41 Id. at 976.
42 H.R. 4783, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 4794, 97th Cong. (1981); S. 1758, 97th Cong.
(1981). See Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794 H.R.
4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 before The Subcom. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
The Administration Of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 1-3 (1982)
[hereinafter Home Recording of Copywrited Works] (opening statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
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picture industry's chief lobbyist, Jack Valenti, was the first witness.
He appeared armed with a forty-nine page legal memorandum au-
thored by Harvard law professor Laurence Tribe, which argued that
any law that exempted home videotaping from liability for copyright
infringement would be an unconstitutional taking of private property
in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 43 Moreover, the memo contin-
ued, such an exemption would "endanger, and might indeed imper-
missibly abridge, First Amendment rights" because "motion picture
and television producers will speak less often if the reward for their
efforts is greatly reduced." 44 Valenti's testimony was nothing if not
colorful:
Now, we cannot live in a marketplace, Mr. Chairman-you
simply cannot live in a marketplace, where there is one
unleashed animal in that marketplace, unlicensed. It would
no longer be a marketplace; it would be a kind of a jungle,
where this one unlicensed instrument is capable of devouring
all that people had invested in and labored over and brought
forth as a film or a television program, and, in short, laying
waste to the orderly distribution of this product .... I say to
you that the VCR is to the American film producer and the
American public as the Boston strangler is to the woman
home alone.45
By the spring of 1982, when the House convened its Los Angeles
hearings, more than three million people had purchased home video
cassette recorders, and videotape rental stores had sprung up across
the U.S. The motion picture industry emphasized that studios did
"not intend to file any actions against homeowners now or in the fu-
ture.' '46  Indeed, the industry had thought better of its demand that
video tape recorders be outlawed. Instead, motion picture studios had
43 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works, supra note 42, at 4-16, 67-115 (testimony of
Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. and memorandum of Prof.
Laurence H. Tribe).
" Laurence H. Tribe, Memorandum of Constitutional Law on Copyright Compensation
Issues Raised by the Proposed Congressional Reversal of the Ninth Circuit's Betamax Ruling
(Dec. 5, 1981), inserted in Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders) Hearings on
S. 1758 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 126 (1982).
45 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works, supra note 42.
46 See Id. (testimony of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Assocation of American,
Inc.). In November of 2004, 28 years after the first suit filed against William Griffiths, motion
picture studios did what Jack Valenti had promised they would not do: they filed lawsuits
against multiple consumers. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox v. Doe, No. C 04-04862 WHA
(N.D. Cal. Filed Nov. 16, 2004); Universal City Studios Productions v. Doe, No.
1:2004CV03343 (N.D. Ga. Filed Nov. 15, 2004); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures v. Doe, No.
1:2004CV02006 (D. D.C. filed Nov. 15, 2004).
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agreed to support a bill that subjected video recorders to a compulsory
license, levied royalties on the sale of video tape recorders and blank
cassettes, and required copyright owners' permission for rental or
lease of videotapes.4 7 The recording industry began to lobby to ex-
pand the legislation to impose like royalties on the sales of audio tape
recorders and blank audiotapes.48 The House and Senate held more
hearings. Video recorder dealers organized grass roots opposition to
the legislation. On June 14, 1982, the Supreme Court agreed to hear
the Sony case, and members of Congress sat back to wait and see
what the Court would do.
II. SONY IN THE SUPREME COURT
A. The First Oral Argument
By the day of oral argument, more than five million consumers
had purchased Betamax videocassette recorders. Dean Dunlavey,
counsel for Sony, began his argument by noting that the studios had
not yet sought a remedy against any of the five million Betamax own-
ers, but that the decision below put all of them at risk for an award of
statutory damages for each of the programs they recorded at home for
their own private viewing. The gist of Dunlavey's argument was that
the majority of copyright owners had no objection to consumer home
videotaping, and it would make no sense to let a small minority use
copyright litigation to force a useful and popular device with signifi-
cant legitimate uses from the market.49
Stephen Kroft, arguing on behalf of the studios, then assured the
Justices that affirming the Ninth Circuit's decision did not mean that
the Betamax would be banned. As he had urged in his brief, the
Court could instead impose a royalty on the sale of Betamax record-
ers. Several Justices asked Kroft to speak to the staple article of
commerce doctrine applied by the trial court. Kroft vigorously dis-
puted that the staple article of commerce doctrine was appropriate - it
arose in patent law, which, he said, was unlike copyright law, and, in
any event, the Betamax wouldn't qualify as a staple article of com-
merce because it was not suitable for any legitimate uses - it was de-
signed and marketed to make unauthorized copies of entire television
programs without compensation to the copyright owner. Kroft sug-
gested that the Court instead apply a standard it had articulated the
47 See H.R. 5488, 97th Cong. (1982); S. Amdt. 1242 to S. 1758, 97th Cong. (1981).
48 See H.R. 5705, 97th Cong. (1982); S. Amdt. 1333 to S. 1758, 97th Cong. (1982).
49 Transcript of oral argument, Sony (Jan. 18, 1983) (No. 81-1687), available at 1983 U.S.
TRANS LEXIS 89, *1-23.
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previous term in a trademark case. In Inwood Laboratories v. Ives
Laboratories,50 a case involving the copying of drug capsule colors,
Kroft claimed the Court had remarked that selling a product with the
implication that it could be used to infringe a trademark might give
rise to liability for contributory trademark infringement. 5' Kroft ar-
gued that the same standard should apply in copyright cases. Justice
Stevens then asked Kroft to address fair use. Kroft denied that the
fair use doctrine would apply to home videotaping. When pressed on
the issue of harm, Kroft complained that the district court had misal-
located the burden of proof, wrongly expecting plaintiffs to prove
harm rather than requiring defendants to disprove it. 52
The papers of Supreme Court Justice Harry A. Blackmun indicate
that when the Justices met in conference to discuss the case, three
days after oral argument, a majority of them were disposed to affirm
the Ninth Circuit opinion, at least in part.53 Justices Blackmun, Mar-
shall and Rehnquist were comfortable with the conclusion that con-
sumer home videotaping taping was illegal infringement, and voted to
affirm. Justice Powell felt that home use should be deemed fair use,
but saw no way to draw a workable distinction between fair and in-
fringing uses, and he, too, voted to affirm. Justice O'Connor was also
disposed to affirm: if she were a legislator, she said, she would vote
to exempt home use, but Congress had not done so in the 1976 Copy-
right Act.54  Justices Brennan, White and Burger argued that time-
shifting was fair use, but building a videotape library was infringe-
ment. They were inclined to remand for additional fact-finding on
- 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
51 456 U.S. 844, 851 (1982). Kroft's reading of the Inwood opinion is something of a
stretch. The passage he cited was the majority's recitation of the standard articulated by the
Second Circuit for proof of intentional inducement of trademark infringement. Id. Elsewhere in
the opinion, the Court insisted that liability for contributory trademark infringement required
proof that defendant had either intentionally induced infringement or continued to supply its
products to retailers whom it knew were using them to infringe trademarks. Id. at 854. The
Court reversed the court of appeals decision finding contributory infringement on an unrelated
ground.
52 Transcript of oral argument, Sony (Jan. 18, 1983) (No. 81-1687), available at 1983 U.S.
TRANS LEXIS 89 (citing Inwood, 456 U.S. at 851(1982)).
53 The Library of Congress Manuscript Reading Room houses the Supreme Court papers
of Justices Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall, Jr. Those papers
include handwritten and dictated notes, drafts of opinions, memoranda from law clerks and
letters and memoranda sent by the Justices to one another. For a different, detailed analysis of
the genesis of the Sony opinions drawn from the papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall, see
Jonathan Band & Andrew J. McLaughlin, The Marshall Papers: A Peek Behind the Scenes at
the Making of Sony v. Universal, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 427 (1994).
54 Handwritten notes of Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Jan. 21, 1983).
55 Id.; see also undated file memo in the papers of Justice William A Brennan. The memo
appears to have been written or dictated between the January 18, 1983 oral argument and the
January 21, 1983 conference. In it, Justice Brennan expresses his view that time-shifting is fair
use but library building is not, that Sony might well be liable for statutory damages or profits as
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the issue of Sony's liability, given that the Betamax was used for both
infringing and non-infringing purposes. Only Justice Stevens insisted
that the copyright statute did not prohibit consumers from making
single copies of copyrighted works for their own private use.56 Since
consumers' use of the Betamax did not infringe plaintiffs' copyrights,
Stevens argued, Sony could not be held liable as a contributory in-
fringer.
As the senior Justice voting with the majority to affirm the Ninth
Circuit decision, Justice Thurgood Marshall assigned the majority
opinion to Harry Blackmun. Justice Stevens announced that he would
be writing a dissent. He sent a note to Justice Blackmun, with copies
to the other seven Justices, arguing that the copyright law permitted
the making of a single copy for private noncommercial use. A review
of the 1976 Copyright Act's legislative history, he urged, indicated
that Congress never directly confronted the issue of private copying,
but a variety of sources documented a widely-shared understanding
that it was not illegal for individuals to make single copies for their
own use. Moreover, the fact that the statute entitled copyright owners
to seek statutory damages even from innocent infringers potentially
subjected both consumers and the manufacturers of copying equip-
ment to "truly staggering liability., 57 Justice Powell responded in a
memo to Justice Blackmun indicating that, while he had voted with
Blackmun initially, Justice Stevens's "single copy" argument was
giving him pause, and he would wait to read drafts of the majority
and dissenting opinions before deciding.
58
B. The First Drafts
On June 13, Justice Blackmun circulated the first draft of his opin-
ion for the Court. The draft began with a rejection of Stevens' argu-
ment that a single copy made for noncommercial purposes did not
infringe: "Although the word "copies" appears in the plural in §
106(1), it is clear that the making of even a single unauthorized copy
is prohibited." 59 Examining the 1976 Act, Justice Blackmun listed a
a contributory infringer, but that a flat ban on the sale of Betamaxes would be improper.
56 See Memorandum to the File from Justice John Paul Stevens (Jan. 20, 1983).
57 Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Jan. 24, 1983).
58 Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Feb. 3, 1983).
59 1st Draft, Opinion in Sony (No. 81-1687 (circulated by Justice Blackmun, June 13,
1983), at 7. Justice Blackmun quoted House and Senate Report statements that the reproduction
right "means the right to produce a material object in which the work is duplicated, transcribed,
imitated, or simulated in a fixed form from which it can be 'perceived, reproduced or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."' Id. at 8 (quoting 1975
Senate Report 58, 1976 House Report 61).
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variety of detailed exemptions that permit the making of a single
copy. When Congress intended to excuse the making of a single
copy, it had said so, and articulated the circumstances under which
that copy might be made in great detail. Congress had, moreover,
shown no difficulty expressly providing special treatment for private
use when it concluded it was warranted: the 1976 Act limited the
copyright owner's performance right to public performances, and the
library photocopying provisions include privileges limited to re-
searchers engaged in "private study, scholarship or research. ' 6° If the
law incorporated an implicit exemption for private copies, Justice
Blackmun concluded, these provisions would be completely unneces-
sary.
Justice Blackmun then rejected the argument that home copying
could be excused under the fair use doctrine. The fair use doctrine, he
explained, acts as a subsidy, at the copyright owners' expense, to
permit subsequent authors to make limited use of copyrighted works
for the public good. Fair uses were always productive uses, "reflect-
ing some benefit to the public beyond that produced by the first au-
thor's work.",61 Home taping was not such a use, so there was no
need to subsidize it at the authors' expense. Unproductive uses might
in some circumstances escape liability because they caused little or no
harm. Where a use was unproductive, however, courts should not
deem it fair if the copyright owner produced evidence of a potential
for harm. In that case, the use would be found infringing "unless the
user can demonstrate affirmatively that permitting the use would have
no tendency to harm the market for or the value of the copyrighted
work., 62  Thus, unproductive uses could qualify for fair use only
when they had no potential to harm the copyright owner's market.
The introduction of evidence of potential harm from an unproductive
use would shift the burden of proof to the defendant to disprove po-
tential harm.
As for Sony's liability for consumers' use of its recorders, Justice
Blackmun wrote that contributory liability required neither direct
involvement with individual infringers nor actual knowledge of par-
The making of even a single videotape recording ("VTR") at home falls within this
definition; the VTR user produces a material object from which the copyrighted
work later can be perceived. Unless Congress intended a special exemption for the
making of a single copy for personal use, we must conclude that VTR recording is
contrary to the exclusive rights granted by § 106(1).
Id. at8.
60 Id. at 12-13.
61 Id. at 22.
62 Id. at 26.
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ticular instances of infringement. "It is sufficient that the defendant
have reason to know that infringement is taking place. 63 By adver-
tising the Betamax as suitable for the recording of "favorite shows"
and "classic movies," Sony had induced copyright infringement by
Betamax owners.64 Justice Blackmun conceded that some consumers
may well have used Sony's recorders for non-infringing as well as
infringing uses, but "the existence of noninfringing uses does not ab-
solve the manufacturer of a product whose 'most conspicuous pur-
pose' is to infringe., 65 Since copyright infringement was the Be-
tamax's primary use, Sony was liable as a contributory infringer.
Even before Justice Blackmun completed the first draft of the
opinion, Justice Stevens had prepared his alternative, and he circu-
lated it on the same day. Stevens charactertized the suit as an effort to
"control the way William Griffiths watches television. ,,66 Stevens
argued that Sony could not be held liable for making and selling Be-
tamax recorders unless the primary use of the Betamax were an in-
fringing one; he concluded that it was not. Until the Court of Appeals
decision below, Stevens began, no court had ever held that purely
private noncommercial copying infringed the reproduction right, and
the copyright law had never been understood to prohibit it. While the
language of the 1909 Copyright Act appeared to give copyright own-
ers control over the making of even a single copy, courts had not ap-
plied it so literally. 67 Litigation challenging the massive photocopy-
ing of scientific articles by the National Library of Medicine had pro-
ceeded on the express assumption that individual scholars acted law-
fully when they made single copies for their own use.68 When Con-
gress extended copyright protection to sound recordings in 1971, it
had repeatedly affirmed that the Copyright Act did not then reach69
consumer home taping of music, and would not reach it as amended.
Justice Stevens found it unlikely that Congress could possibly have
intended the 1976 Act to prohibit private home videotaping. Nothing
in the language or legislative history of the 1976 Act supported a con-
clusion that Congress intended home video taping to be treated differ-
63 Id. at 30-31.
64 Id. at 32-33.
65 Id. at 35.
66 1st draft, Memorandum of Justice Stevens, Sony (No.81-1687) (circulated June 13,
1983) at 22. Justice Stevens, apparently hoping to pry a fifth vote loose from Blackmun's
majority, styled his draft as a "Memorandum" rather than a dissent.
67 Id. at 16.
68 Id. at 5 (citing Williams & Wilkins v. U.S., 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. CI. 1973), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975)).
69 Id. at 9-11.
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ently from home audio taping.7° Stevens suggested that Congress
would not lightly have elected intrusive regulation of noncommercial
conduct within the home. "It would plainly be unconstitutional," he
suggested, "to prohibit a person from singing a copyrighted song in
the shower or jotting down a copyrighted poem he hears on the ra-
dio.' Moreover, he rejected the argument that Congress might have
intended to prohibit home taping on the understanding that the prohi-
bition would never be enforced against individual consumers, like
defendant William Griffiths.
It is significant that the Act does not purport to create "safe"
violations. It plainly provides that every act of
infringement - even if performed in complete good
faith - gives rise to a minimum statutory liability of $100.
That command cannot simply be transformed into a matter of
indifference because the copyright owners do not intend to
collect the heavy tribute that is their due.72
Finally, Justice Stevens argued that even if the Court concluded that
home taping infringed Universal Studios's copyrights, and that that
infringement entitled them to some remedy against Sony, it was diffi-
cult to imagine a remedy properly within the competence of the
courts.
In their complaint, respondents pray for an injunction against
the further manufacture or sale of video cassette records.
They do so despite the fact that they have suffered no tangible
harm. They claim the injunction is required by the potential
future impact of this innovation. Surely that impact can be
more precisely gauged by legislators than by this Court, on
this record.73
C. Back and Forth Among the Justices
Justice Stevens supplemented his draft with a memo noting the ar-
eas of agreement and disagreement between his memorandum and
Justice Blackmun's opinion, and criticizing Blackmun's formulation
70 Id. at 12, 14.
71 Id. at 17-18.
72 Id. at 19 (footnote omitted). Indeed, the Studios' brief had emphasized their "absolute
statutory right" to elect to recover statutory damages without introducing proof of harm. See
Brief for Respondents, Sony, at 16 n. 18.
73 1 st draft, Memorandum of Justice Stevens, at 20 (footnote omitted).
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of fair use.74 Blackmun responded with a memo of his own suggest-
ing that Stevens had misread the legislative history of the Copyright
Act. The legislative history, Blackmun argued, indicated that Con-
gress had designed the 1976 Act to cover new and unexpected tech-
nologies as well as known ones, freeing Congress from the obligation
to revisit the law each time a new use arose. In response to a line of
Supreme Court decisions reading the earlier copyright statute nar-
rowly, Blackmun insisted, Congress had adopted broad language to
compel the courts to apply the law to new and unforeseen technolo-
gies. 5
Justice Brennan then circulated a memo seeking to put a third al-
ternative on the table. Brennan disputed Justice Stevens's conclusion
that Congress had implicitly exempted private, non-commercial copy-
ing from liability, but thought that that was a point the Court need not
address:
As Harry explains, Sony can be liable for contributory in-
fringement only if the Betamax's "most conspicuous pur-
pose" or "primary use" is an infringing use .... I, however,
think that a good deal of timeshifting is fair use .... I ques-
tion whether the "ordinary"/"productive" distinction can be
used to shift the burden of proving or disproving economic
harm in a broad class of cases... In my view, the Studios' al-
legations of potential harm ... are simply empty when ap-
plied to most timeshifting. Unless the burden is shifted, there
is no need for a remand to determine that a substantial
amount of timeshifting is fair use. And if that is true, then I
cannot agree that the Betamax's "primary use" is infringe-
ment or that Sony's advertisements evince a purpose to profit
76from infringement.
The following day, Justice Blackmun circulated a revised second
draft, containing additional discussion of the private use and contribu-
tory infringement issues, and an expanded treatment of how the lower
court might address the remedy for Sony's infringement.77 Justices
Rehnquist and Marshall agreed to join that opinion.
Justice O'Connor, who had been part of the initial majority voting
to affirm the Ninth Circuit opinion, had reservations. She wrote to
74 Justice John Paul Stevens, Memorandum to the Conference (June 13, 1983).
75 Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Memorandum to the Conference 1-2 (June 14, 1983).
76 Memorandum from Justice William A. Brennan (June 14, 1983).




Blackmun, noting her agreement with the draft's conclusions that
Sony violated the studio's reproduction right and that the fair use doc-
trine did not apply. "However," she continued, "I have considerable
difficulty in rejecting the District Court's view that the respondents
suffered no harm, actual or potential, as a result of Sony's use.''78
O'Connor expressed concern about Blackmun's fair use formulation,
indicating that she was not persuaded that the burden of proof on the
issue of harm should be shifted to Sony; wherever the burden of proof
lay, however, she read Judge Ferguson's opinion as finding no harm,
actual or potential.79
Justice Blackmun responded with a suggestion that the Court re-
mand the case for new factfinding on the issue of harm. He was un-
willing to adopt a standard requiring copyright plaintiffs to prove
potential harm, but suggested language that clarified that the copy-
right owner's burden of production was a substantial one, requiring
more than mere speculation. 80 Justice O'Connor responded, question-
ing whether a remand on the issue of harm would be fruitful; it
seemed clear that Judge Ferguson had concluded that there was no
concrete evidence that the Betamax would harm the studios.8' In the
absence of any harm, Justice O'Connor preferred the finding of liabil-
ity against Sony to be reversed outright.
If there were to be a remand, Justice O'Connor continued, it was
essential that the opinion acknowledge that fair use encompassed un-
productive uses as well as productive ones. She felt strongly that the
burden of proof on the issue of harm should stay with the copyright
owner rather than shifting to the alleged infringer. Finally, O'Connor
questioned Justice Blackmun's rejection of the "staple article of
commerce" doctrine:
I had thought that the "staple article" doctrine developed in
order to limit the patent holder from depriving society of the
good that comes from the existence of other enterprises that
nevertheless frustrate the patent holder's monopoly to some
degree. I see no reason why we should not be similarly con-
cerned with what the copyright holder does with his monop-
oly. If the videorecorder has substantial noninfringing uses,
we should be reluctant to find vicarious liability. In addition,
78 Letter from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (June 16,
1983).
79 Id.
80 Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (June 16,
1983).
81 Letter from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to Justice Harry A Blackmun (June 18,
1983).
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I think the focus of the inquiry should not be whether virtu-
ally all of the copied material is copyrighted, but rather,
whether virtually all of the copying amounts to an infringe-
ment. Even if you do not wish to import the "staple article"
doctrine directly to the copyright area, I fail to see why the
same standard-whether the item is capable of substantial
noninfringing use-should not be used.82
Justice Powell sent Blackmun a memo indicating that he was trou-
bled by some of the same points Justice O'Connor had raised.
83 Jus-
tice Blackmun circulated a revised draft seeking to meet their con-
cerns, 84 reformulating the fair use analysis in an attempt to reach a
compromise on the burden of proof. For Blackmun, what was crucial
was that the law not require copyright owners to prove actual harm
when a new technology was at issue, because that would require them
to wait to seek relief until too late. The legislative history of the stat-
ute, he insisted, "makes clear that copyright owners are not to be de-
prived of protection simply because the effects of a new technology
are unknown., 85  In order to accommodate O'Connor's concerns,
Blackmun revised the language in his draft to put the burden of proof
of harm on the plaintiffs, but require them to show only "a reasonable
possibility of harm.",86 Seeking to find middle ground on the staple
article of commerce, Blackmun adopted a phrase from O'Connor's
letter: the focus of a contributory infringement inquiry should be
"whether virtually all of the copying amounts to infringement."
Justice O'Connor wrote back the same day, requesting additional
changes.87 She continued to be dissatisfied with the treatment of the
burden of proof on harm. Justice Blackmun's "reasonable possibility
of harm" struck her as allowing copyright plaintiffs to prove too little.
She proposed that the opinion instead describe the burden of proof
using the statutory language, and require plaintiffs to prove "harm to
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work., 88 She
objected to language implying that the studios had already met that
burden in the lower court, since Judge Ferguson's findings indicated
82 Id. at 2-3.
83 Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell to Justice Jarry A. Blackmun (June 20, 1983).
84 3d Draft, Opinion in Sony (No. 81-1687) (circulated by Justice Blackmun, June 21,
1983).
85 Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justices Lewis F Powell and Sandra Day
O'Connor (June 21, 1983).
86 3d Draft, Opinion in Sony (No. 81-1687) (circulated by Justice Blackmun, June 21,
1983) at 26.
87 Letter from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (June 21,
1983).
88 Id. at 2.
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that no harm had been shown. Finally, O'Connor wrote, she re-
mained convinced that the standard for contributory infringement
should be the one she had articulated earlier: "is the VTR capable of
substantial non-infringing uses. 89  If Blackmun incorporated her
suggestions into a fourth draft, O'Connor continued, she would join
that opinion.
Justice Blackmun replied that he was reluctantly willing to accept
Justice O'Connor's formulation for the standard for contributory in-
fringement, but would not yield further on the question of the burden
of proof in fair use:
The statutory language to which you refer comes into play
when a productive use is found. Under your proposal, the
copyright owner would have to prove actual harm to the
value of the copyright or to a potential market even for un-
productive uses. The problem with this, as I have tried to
point out, is that copyright owners would be deprived of pro-
tection when the technology is a new one and when predic-
tions of harm are necessarily imprecise. I strongly feel that
the standard articulated in the opinion-that the copyright
owner must show a "reasonable possibility of harm"-is the
correct one.90
Meanwhile, Justice White proposed that Justices Brennan and Ste-
vens try to assemble a majority for an opinion that took a position
between the views that Brennan and Stevens had expressed following
the oral argument. Justice White suggested that such an opinion
could reverse the judgment against Sony as a contributory infringer
on the ground that the studios had failed to prove injury or damages,
and leave the question of consumer liability unresolved. 91
Justice Stevens circulated some new language on June 23.92 The
exchange of letters between Justice O'Connor and Justice Blackmun
had been distributed to all nine Justices, and Justice Stevens's new
draft seemed designed to attract O'Connor's vote by adopting the
suggestions Blackmun had rejected. Thus, while the draft nominally
followed the model proposed in Justice Brennan's June 14 memo,
concluding that because time-shifting caused the studios no harm,
there was no basis for imposing contributory liability on Sony, the
89 Id. at 3-4 (emphasis in original).
90 Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (June 23,
1983) (emphasis in original).
91 Letter from Justice Byron R. White to Justice William J. Brennan (June 17, 1983).
92 Memorandum from Justice John Paul Stevens to the Conference (June 23, 1983).
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draft also incorporated the suggestions that O'Connor had been trying
unsuccessfully to persuade Blackmun to include in his opinion. In
particular, after emphasizing both the studios' failure to show any
harm from the Betamax, and the trial court's finding that copyright
owners other than the studios encouraged consumers to time-shift
their programs, the draft imported the staple article of commerce doc-
trine from patent law and placed the burden of proof on the question
of potential harm in a fair use analysis squarely on the plaintiff.
O'Connor sent a note to Blackmun noting her agreement with Ste-
vens's treatment of the burden of proof, and suggesting that Black-
mun incorporate a modified version of it into his opinion. 93 "This
issue," she wrote, "is significant, because the burden will likely de-
termine the outcome of not only this case but most others in the fu-
ture. I recognize the delicate balance we must make between protec-
tion of the copyright owner and encouragement of new technology."
94
Three days later, Justice Blackmun wrote back, refusing to make
additional changes:
I have endeavored of the past several days to accommodate
your many concerns. My letter of June 23 to you represents
the limit of what I am willing to do. Five votes are not that
important to me when I feel that proper legal principles are
involved.95
Justice Stevens, meanwhile, had circulated his completed draft, which
combined the Brennan distinction between time-shifting and library
building with the O'Connor formulations of the burden of proof and
staple article of commerce doctrine, all while purporting to decide
only the contributory infringement issue and leave the question of
consumer liability for home taping for another day.96
93 Letter from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (June 25,
1983).
94 Id. at 1.
95 Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (June 28,
1983).
96 2d Draft, Memorandum of Justice Stevens in Sony (No. 81-1687) (circulated by Justice
Stevens, June 27, 1983). The draft noted that the Court had granted certiorari to address
whether home videotaping was copyright infringement and, if so whether the manufacturers of
videotape recorders were liable for advertising and selling them and whether a judicially im-
posed royalty was a permissible form of relief. Because the district court's factual findings
were dispositive on the contributory infringement issue, the Court need decide only that ques-
tion:
In brief, the critical facts are these: the principal use of the video tape recorder is to
enable its owner to view a program he would otherwise miss; this practice, known as
"time-shifting," enlarges the television viewing audience. For that reason, a signifi-
cant number of producers of television programs have no objection to the copying of
their program for private home viewing. For the same reason, even the two respon-
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The end of June is a busy time at the Supreme Court: the Court ad-
journs each summer in early July, and by tradition disposes of all of
the cases on its calendar before adjournment, so by late June the
Court is hurrying to finish its work on all remaining decisions. Jus-
tice Brennan sent around a memo that did not offer to join Stevens's
most recent opinion, but noted that the draft "came closer to express-
ing" Brennan's views. Justice Byron White sent a note to Chief Jus-
tice Burger suggesting that the Court set the case for reargument the
following term: "If this case is to come down this term, I prefer
John's submission to any others. I would much rather, however, have
the case reargued. It is important, and I would feel more comfortable
if we could give the case more attention than time will now allow. 97
dents in this case, who do object to time shifting, were unable to prove that the prac-
tice has caused them any harm or creates any likelihood of future harm.
Id. at 2. The draft then discussed the doctrine of contributory copyright infringement, and
expressly adopted patent law's staple article of commerce doctrine. As framed by Justice Ste-
vens, the staple article of commerce doctrine applied to any article that was "widely used for
legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, if we apply the patent law rule, it need merely be
capable of significant noninfringing uses." Id. at 24. The question," Stevens continued, "is thus
whether the Betamax is capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses." Noncommer-
cial private time-shifting was such a use both because much of it was authorized and because
even unauthorized time shifting qualified as fair use:
Three different factors lead to the conclusion that under a "rule of reason" analysis,
the respondents failed to carry their burden of proving in this case that home time
shifting is not fair use. Those factors are (A) their complete failure to show that
home time shifting would harm the potential market for, or value of, any identifiable
copyrighted material, (B) the legislative history tending to show that Congress un-
derstood such activity to be fair use, and (C) the profoundly disturbing policy impli-
cations of finding that home time shifting is not fair use.
Id. at 31. The draft proceeded to a discussion of the four factors enumerated in section 107. It
addressed only the final factor, the "effect of the use upon the market for or value of the copy-
righted work." If a use has no effect on the potential market for a work, Stevens explained, it
has no effect on the author's incentives to create. Prohibiting it would simply hinder access to
the work without any countervailing benefit:
Of course, every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an exploitation
of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright. But noncommercial
uses are a different matter. Any plaintiff seeking to challenge the non-commercial use of a
copyrighted work should, as a threshold matter, prove either that the particular use is
harmful or that if it should become widespread, it would be more likely than not that some
non-minimal damage would result to the potential market for, or the value of, his particu-
lar copyrighted work. Actual present harm need not be shown; such a requirement would
leave the copyright holder with no defense against predictable damage. Nor is it necessary
to show with certainty that future harm will result. What is necessary is a showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists. If
the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood may be presumed. But if it is for
purely private purposes, however, it must be demonstrated.
Id. at 32 (emphasis in original). This formulation combined Justice Stevens's initial conclusion
that noncommercial private copying should be treated differently from commercial copying with
Justice O'Connor's insistence that the burden of proof on the issue of harm should be assigned
to the plaintiff.
97 Letter from Justice Byron R. White to Chief Justice Warren Burger (June 28, 1983).
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Justice O'Connor chimed in, noting that she also preferred Stevens's
most recent draft to the alternative, but would probably agree to set
the case for reargument.98 Justice Rehnquist also expressed support
for reargument. 99 Justice Stevens remained hopeful of resolving the
case that term rather than holding it over, and he circulated a further
draft of his opinion. This draft incorporated extensive discussion of
the testimony of copyright owners who welcomed consumer home
taping as a method of expanding their audience, and an expanded
discussion of the district court's findings on the studios' failure to
show any harm. 1°° It otherwise tracked the earlier draft. Stevens be-
lieved that the draft reflected a consensus of the views of Justices
Brennan, Burger, White and O'Connor as well as himself. The Court
decided, however, to set the case for reargument.
On July 6 th, the final day of the 1982 term, copyright lobbyists and
journalists assembled at the Court to be the first to read the Betamax
decision. There was no Betamax decision to read. The Court issued
an order restoring the case to the argument calendar. It asked for no
new briefs and identified no new issues it wanted counsel to address.
The Justices had simply run out of time to finish their opinions.'1
D. The Second Oral Argument
Sony was reargued on October 3, 1983. Dean Dunlavey argued
first for Sony, and noted that by the end of the year 9 V2 million
households, or roughly 10% of the television viewing audience,
would own videotape recorders. Home taping, he argued, was clearly
fair use. Justice O'Connor asked whether the Court needed to resolve
the fair use issue. Could the Justices not resolve the contributory in-
fringement question without deciding whether home taping was fair
use? Dunlavey agreed that the Court could indeed take that approach:
"There are two roads to Rome." He then returned to his discussion of
fair use. Justice White interrupted: "I'm wondering," he asked, "do
we have to reach the questions you've been discussing if we agreed
with you that this is a staple article of commerce and that there's no
contributory infringement?" "If you agreed with me," responded
Dunlavey, "you would think this case would be over." Justice White
98 Letter from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to Chief Justice Warren Burger (June 28,
1983).
99 Memorandum from Justice William H. Rehnquist to the Conference (June 28, 1983).
100 3d Draft, Memorandum of Justice Stevens in Sony (No. 81-1687) (June 28, 1983) at 24-
26, 30-34.
01 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 463 U.S. 1226 (1983). See Mark




persisted: "Well we wouldn't have to talk about fair use at all, would
we, if we agreed with you that this is a staple article of commerce?"
Dunlavey conceded that that was the case.10 2
Stephen Kroft stood up to argue for the studios. "Underneath all
the legal arguments and legal labels that we've thrown around in this
case, the case is really very simple and straightforward," he began.
"Petitioners have created a billion dollar industry based entirely on
the taking of someone else's property. . . ." 03justice White and Jus-
tice Stevens had a number of questions about the staple article of
commerce test; Kroft insisted that it had no application to the case.
Justice O'Connor noted that the district court had found no harm, and
Kroft responded that under the copyright statute, plaintiffs were not
required to prove harm. Rather, Kroft argued, a finding of infringe-
ment led to a presumption of harm, shifting the burden to defendants
to prove there would not be any harm. Justice Stevens asked for an
example of harm that time-shifting might cause, and Kroft responded
that homemade tapes could compete with pre-recorded cassettes.
"Fair use," Kroft continued,
was a very narrow doctrine designed for very limited applica-
tion, for use in the creation of scholarly or research works or
works for contemporary comment or news reporting pur-
poses, and only when a small amount was taken. Off the air
recording for home entertainment purposes doesn't even
come anywhere close to fitting that definition.104
At the conference following the reargument, according to Justice
Blackmun's handwritten notes, only Justices Marshall and Blackmun
voted to affirm the Ninth Circuit decision. Justices Powell and
Rehnquist favored affirming the portion of the court of appeals deci-
sion holding that consumer home videotaping infringed the studios'
copyrights, but wanted to remand on the issue of contributory in-
fringement. Justices Burger, Brennan, White, O'Connor and Stevens
voted to reverse the decision outright. Justice Stevens undertook to
write the opinion for the Court; Justice Blackmun agreed to write the
dissent.
1
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E. The Supreme Court Decision
Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court characterized the lawsuit as
an "unprecedented attempt to impose copyright liability upon the dis-
tributors of copying equipment," and rejected "[s]uch an expansion of
the copyright privilege" as "beyond the limits of the grants authorized
by Congress."' 0 5 Stevens's analysis essentially tracked the arguments
made in his June 28 draft, combining his own solicitude for private
noncommercial copying with Justice Brennan's distinction between
time-shifting and library building, and Justice O'Connor's preference
for the staple article of commerce doctrine and conviction that the
burden of proof on the issue of harm to the copyright owner in a fair
use determination should rest on the plaintiff. Stitching those posi-
tions together into a coherent opinion was not easy, and while the
result the opinion reached was immediately clear, the reasoning it
relied on was, at best, oblique.
Justice Stevens began by explaining that the courts had been and
should be reluctant to expand copyright protection in response to new
technology rather than allowing Congress to craft appropriate solu-
tions. There was no precedent in copyright law for imposing liability
for selling a product that enabled users to make infringing copies.
The closest analogy to such a theory of liability was found in patent
law, which imposed liability for contributory infringement but also
exempted the sale of staple articles of commerce from liability. Al-
though the Court recognized substantial differences between patent
and copyright law, both sought to strike a balance between the inter-
est in effective protection and the rights of others to engage freely in
unrelated areas of commerce. "Accordingly," the opinion continued,
"the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of com-
merce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is
widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need
merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.' 0 6
Justice Stevens answered the question whether the Betamax was
capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses by identifying
private, noncommercial time-shifting as one use that satisfied that
standard. 0 7
105 Sony, 464 U.S. at 421.
106 Id. at 442.
107 Justice Stevens reviewed the testimony of copyright owners who welcomed time-
shifting. The representative of one PBS station had testified that his station published a program
guide inviting viewers to tape more than half of the programs on its schedule. Fred Rogers had




Of course, the fact that other copyright holders may welcome
the practice of time-shifting does not mean that respondents
should be deemed to have granted a license to copy their pro-
grams. Third-party conduct would be wholly irrelevant in an
action for direct infringement of respondents' copyrights.
But in an action for contributory infringement against the
seller of copying equipment, the copyright holder may not
prevail unless the relief that he seeks affects only his pro-
grams, or unless he speaks for virtually all copyright holders
with an interest in the outcome. 10
8
Stevens then turned to unauthorized time-shifting, and concluded that
it qualified as fair use. Justice Stevens rejected the position that only
productive uses could be deemed fair.109 He focused instead on the
distinction between commercial uses and noncommercial ones. "If the
Betamax were used to make copies for a commercial or profit-making
purpose," he explained, "such use would presumptively be unfair.
The contrary presumption is appropriate here, however, because the
District Court's findings plainly establish that time-shifting for private
home use must be characterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit activ-
ity.,1
10
This is not, however, the end of the inquiry because Congress
has also directed us to consider "the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."
§ 107(4). The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for
creative effort. Even copying for noncommercial purposes
may impair the copyright holder's ability to obtain the re-
wards that Congress intended him to have. But a use that has
no demonstrable effect upon the potential market for, or the
value of, the copyrighted work need not be prohibited in or-
der to protect the author's incentive to create. The prohibition
of such noncommercial uses would merely inhibit access to
ideas without any countervailing benefit."'
In this case, the record makes it perfectly clear that there are many important produc-
ers of national and local television programs who find nothing objectionable about
the enlargement in the size of the television audience that results from the practice of
time-shifting for private home use.
Id. at 446.
108 Id. (emphasis in original).
109Id. at 455 n.40.
1 Io1d. at 449.
1I ld at 450-51.
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Thus, while every commercial use should be deemed presumptively
unfair, a challenge to a noncommercial use required proof of present
or potential harm. The studios had failed to satisfy that burden." 2
The Betamax videotape recorder was therefore capable of substantial
non-infringing uses, and Sony's sale of it did not constitute contribu-
tory infringement.' 13
Justice Blackmun's dissent, joined by Justices Marshall, Powell
and Rehnquist, repeated the arguments he had made the previous
spring: the fair use defense was appropriate only when a productive
use merited a subsidy at the copyright owner's expense or when the
use had no potential to affect the author's incentive to create. Time-
shifting, Blackmun argued, was an ordinary use rather than a produc-
tive one, and had a substantial adverse effect on the potential market
for copyrighted television programs. By focusing on the potential
harm to plaintiffs' current markets, Blackmun argued, the majority
had failed to give appropriate weight to the likelihood of harm to the
potential markets created by defendants' technology. The videotape
recorder deprived copyright owners of the opportunity to exploit the
market of potential viewers who found it inconvenient to watch tele-
vision programs at the time they are broadcast. Accordingly, even
time-shifting should not be deemed a fair use.14
III. SONY REVISITED
Is Sony a roadmap for determining whether and when to impose li-
ability on any technology that facilitates copyright infringement? The
correspondence among the Justices suggests they envisioned that it
would be seen as one. Is Sony instead a narrow, fact specific decision
limited in its application to the sale of a device used primarily for
temporary analog copying of free broadcast television? The multi-
21d:
Thus, although every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an
unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copy-
right, noncommercial uses are a different matter. A challenge to a noncommercial
use of a copyrighted work requires proof either that the particular use is harmful, or
that if it should become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market
for the copyrighted work. Actual present harm need not be shown; such a require-
ment would leave the copyright holder with no defense against predictable damage.
Nor is it necessary to show with certainty that future harm will result. What is neces-
sary is a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likeli-
hood of future harm exists. If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood
may be presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be
demonstrated. In this case, respondents failed to carry their burden with regard to
home time-shifting.
113 Id. at 456.
14 See id. at 457-93 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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plicity of rationales included in the opinion for the Court certainly
invite the inference that a different set of facts might have yielded a
different result. "
5
A review of the Court's internal memoranda reveals some of the
concerns that influenced the Sony opinions. Justice Blackmun's pa-
pers emphasize his concern that the copyright owners' bundle of
rights not be eroded by new technology, and his conviction that Con-
gress had drafted the 1976 Act to overcome the Court's historic reluc-
tance to apply the provisions of the statute to novel media and situa-
tions. 11 6 Blackmun insisted that Congress's message was clear: the
courts should impose liability for unauthorized copying except in the
narrow cases Congress had exempted in the statute."17 He was unable
to hold his majority, however, even though most of the other Justices
initially agreed with him that consumer video tape recording violated
the copyright statute, because the implications of his position proved
too hard for a majority of the Court to swallow.
Throughout the process, Justice Stevens expressed solicitude for
consumer privacy." 8  He remained unpersuaded that Congress had
ever intended the copyright statute to reach noncommercial, nonpub-
lic consumer uses. 19 For Justice Brennan, as well as Justice Stevens,
the question of remedy was a key point. The Copyright Act did not
seem to authorize a complete ban of the Betamax at the behest of in-
dividual copyright owners, but it seemed to authorize no intermediate
remedy except statutory damages for every work infringed. In Bren-
nan's and Stevens's view, the statute simply did not contemplate that
courts would engage in the sort of complex, multi-party, compulsory
licensing determination that Congress had elsewhere in the statute
assigned to the Copyright Royalty Tribunal. 2°
115 See 2004 Senate Hearings, supra note 44 (testimony of Mary Beth Peters, Register of
Copyrights)
In my view, if the VCR had been designed in such a way that when a consumer
merely turned it on, copies of all of the programs he recorded with it were immedi-
ately made available to every other VCR in the world, there is no doubt the Sony de-
cision would have gone the opposite way.
116See, e.g., Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Memorandum to the conference (June 14, 1983);
Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (June 21, 1983).
17 Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Memorandum to the conference (June 14, 1983), at 1-2
18 See, e.g., Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (January
24, 1983).
"
9 See, e.g., Memorandum from Justice John Paul Stevens to the Conference (June 13,
1983).
120 Justice William J. Brennan, Memorandum to the conference (June 14, 1983). As origi-
nally enacted, the 1976 Copyright Act provided for a five member Copyright Royalty Tribunal,
charged with setting the amount and division of statutory royalties under the law's four compul-
sory licenses. See §§ 801-810. Congress abolished the Copyright Royalty Tribunal in 1993,
and replaced it with ad hoc Copyright Royalty Arbitration Panels. See Pub. L. No. 103-198, 107
Stat. 2304, 2308. The CRAPs proved unworkable and, in 2004, Congress replaced then with a
20051
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Justice O'Connor, whose changed vote reversed the result in the
case, focused on the studios' failure to show concrete harm.
O'Connor insisted that the burden of proof on the issue of harm, both
in fair use determinations and in infringement actions generally,
should rest with the plaintiff.1 2' She recognized that the balance the
Court struck in Sony would determine the outcome of future disputes
between copyright owners and the developers of new technology,1
22
and appeared to care less about the result in the case before the Court
than the standard that it adopted.
Each of these concerns made its way into the majority opinion.
It's unsurprising, then, that the Court's decision appears to have no
single clear underlying rationale. Some generalizations, however,
seem appropriate. A majority of the Justices initially found the fair
use argument implausible. Neither the briefs nor the first oral argu-
ment persuaded them that consumer home video copying was legiti-
mate fair use. They balked, however, at imposing strict liability on a
maker of copying machines for the copies made by its customers.
Although earlier cases had found defendants who initiated and ac-
tively participated in particular acts of infringement liable as contribu-
tory infringers, 23 the courts had not yet expanded that liability to ac-
tors who made infringement in general easier, more attractive or more
convenient. 24  The copyright statute did not seem to have been de-
signed to apply to infringers whose liability stemmed solely from
their mass distribution of copying devices. The remedies section in
particular seemed to fit this sort of contributory infringement poorly.
Copyright-Royalty-Tribunal-like panel of three copyright royalty judges. See Pub. L. 108-419,
118 Stat. 2341 (2004), codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-805.
121 Letter from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (June 18,
1983), at 2.
122 Letter from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (June 25,
1983).
121 n Kalem v. Harper Brothers. 222 U.S. 55 (1911), and Gershwin Publishing Corp. v.
Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971), defendants who did
not themselves perform infringing works were held liable as contributory infringers for infring-
ing performances. In Kalem, defendant created an unauthorized film version of Ben Hur. The
court held that making the film did not infringe plaintiffs rights under Rev. Stat. § 4952 to
print or dramatize the copyrighted story. The showing of the film by theaters, however, did
violate the plaintiffs copyright, and the court held defendant liable. See Harper Bros. v. Kalem,
169 F. 61 (2d Cir. 1909), affid, 222 U.S. 55 (1911). In Gershwin, defendant arranged, booked,
and managed concerts for municipalities it solicited, featuring artists it engaged, performing
material it selected, but it neglected to secure performance licenses for the material the artists
performed. The Court held defendant liable for the infringing performances.
24 In the wake of Sony, some courts expanded contributory liability to reach these defen-
dants. See, e.g., Fonovisia Inc. v. Cherry Auction, 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996); A & M
Records Inc. v. Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. 1449 (C.D. Cal. 1996). See generally Fred C. Yen,
Sony, Tort Doctrines, and the Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer, 55 CASE WESTERN L. REV. 815 (2005).
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The Justices needed to define a boundary separating contributory in-
fringers from those whose useful technology facilitated infringement
but who should not themselves be deemed infringers. The copyright
statute did not supply one. Kroft had proposed that defendant's sug-
gesting, even by implication, that third parties infringement should
suffice to establish contributory liability. Transposed to the copyright
realm, such a test would be massively over-inclusive, exposing the
makers of photocopiers, tape recorders, cameras, fax machines, type-
writers and crayons to potential liability. Dunlavey had persuaded the
trial court to adopt the staple article of commerce test from patent
law. It drew a plausible boundary between potential defendants, and
Justice O'Connor in particular concluded that it struck the appropriate
balance between copyright owners and innovators. The Supreme
Court majority adopted it.
IV. THE IMPACT OF SONY
The Sony decision was reported widely and approvingly in the
popular press as holding that consumers do not violate the law when
they tape television programs off the air.125  The decision was less
popular with the copyright bar. 126 To copyright lawyers, the Court's
125 See, e.g., Fred Barbash, Supreme Court Chooses Not to Stem the Tide of High Technol-
ogy, WASHINGTON POST, January 22, 1983, at A5; Nathaniel C. Nash, Sony Prevails in the
Betamax Case, N.Y. TIMES, January 22, 1984, § 3, at 16. The Washington Post's entertainment
critic, Tom Shales, put it this way:
There won't be dancing in the streets. There'll be taping in the living rooms. But if
there were dancing in the streets and it was shown on television, you could tape it in
the living room and not have to worry about some trench-coated specter from the
FBI breaking down the door to your condominium.
One small step for man, one giant kick in Big Brother's pants.
Yesterday the Supreme Court ruled, by a frighteningly narrow 5-to-4 majority, that
the home taping of TV programs and movies broadcast on the air is not illegal. Five
million VCR users breathed an enormous "whew." Imagine. No more stuffing the
Betamax machine under the bed at every unexpected ring of the doorbell. No more
disguising tapes as pornographic magazines. No more covert tapings of "Remington
Steele" with the shades drawn and the windows locked.
No more midnight meetings of Time-Shifters Anonymous.
No more worrying if industry lobbyist Jack Valenti and his SWAT team are about to
surround the house, shine in the big blinding spotlights, and order you by bullhorn to
come out with your hands, and your recording heads, up. Citizens! Hear me! We are
free! Free to tape as we choose! To tape as we see fit. To tape till the cows come
home.
To tape "Till the Clouds Roll By," that dopey old MGM musical, the next time a TV
station shows it.
1984 has been marked down to... yes!... 1776!
Tom Shales, 1'll Tape Tomorrow, And So Will You, Thanks to the Court, WASHINGTON POST,
January 18, 1984, at BI.
126See, e.g., William F. Patry, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 205-10
(1985).
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opinion seemed like a sharp break with longstanding precedent; from
the copyright lawyer's standpoint, Justice Blackmun's dissenting
opinion was grounded in long copyright tradition, while Justice Ste-
vens's opinion for the Court had no real historical foundation.'27 The
majority's adoption of the staple article of commerce doctrine seemed
unnecessary and ill-reasoned, and its presumption-mediated treatment
of the burden of proof in fair use cases seemed ill-advised. 128 To
people outside of the copyright bar, the case came immediately to
stand for the proposition that private noncommercial copying was fair
use. To many members of the copyright bar, that represented an un-
warranted expansion of what they had believed to be a fairly confined
privilege. 129 The motion picture industry vowed to overturn the deci-
sion in Congress, but found little enthusiasm in the Senate and House
for imposing a copyright tax on videocassette recorders or blank
tapes.
The Sony Betamax itself was soon superseded by a videorecorder
using the different, and incompatible, VHS format. In 1988, Sony
began phasing out the Betamax video tape recorder. Meanwhile, the
motion picture industry grew to rely on the pre-recorded videocassette
market as a significant source of its income. 13 Revenues from prere-
corded videocassettes (and, later, DVDs) came to outstrip revenues
from domestic theatrical ticket sales. The consumer electronics and
computer industries introduced a variety of devices-digital audio
recorders, digital cameras, computers, MP3 players, and peer-to-peer
file sharing software-capable of infringing as well as legitimate
uses.
The year after Sony, the Supreme Court decided its second fair use
case, Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises.'31 The case involved an
unauthorized pre-publication excerpt from former President Gerald
Ford's memoirs published by The Nation, a small political commen-
tary magazine. The excerpt comprised 300 words from a 400 page
book. The Court held, 6-3, that The Nation was not entitled to the
shelter of the fair use privilege, in part because the news reporting and
political commentary it engaged in had a commercial purpose rather
than a non-profit one. Justice O'Connor authored the opinion. "The
fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a
127 See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 1624 & n. 45 (2001).
128 See, e.g., id. at 363-65; Ralph Oman, The 1976 Copyright Act Revisited: "Lector, si
momumentum requiris, circumspice," 34 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 29, 32-33 (1986).
129 See, e.g., Jack C. Goldstein, Recent Developments in Copyright Law, AIPLA BULL.
635, 636-37 (1984).
130See Ross Johnson, Getting a Piece ofA DVD Windfall, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 13, 2004, at
131 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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separate factor that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use," she
wrote, quoting Sony. '[Every] commercial use of copyrighted mate-
rial is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege
that belongs to the owner of the copyright.' Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S., at 451."
The Harper & Row decision represented the high point of Sony's
influence on the law of fair use. The presumption against commercial
fair use quickly proved unworkable, making fair use unavailable to
biographers, 132 parodists, 133 and news organizations134 because they
published their works for commercial gain. Ten years after Sony, in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,135 the Court finally abandoned the
presumption, along with its twin, the presumption favoring non-
commercial fair use. But before it was abandoned, the presumption
favoring non-commercial fair use had persuaded the owners of copy-
rights in musical works and recordings to lobby Congress to enact a
law that levied a royalty on the sale of digital audio recorders and
blank digital media, while requiring manufacturers of recording de-
vices to incorporate copy protection technology that permitted multi-
ple first-generation copies but prevented the devices from copying
copies. One part of that bargain included a prohibition on bringing
copyright infringement suits against consumers who engaged in non-
commercial copying of recorded music, 136 a concession that seemed
cheap when the governing test for fair use favored noncommercial
copying.
The same case that discarded the presumption against commercial
fair use also reversed course on the issue that had lost Justice Black-
mun his majority: the placement of the burden of proof. In Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Justice Souter held that fair use is an affirmative
132 See New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 583-84 (2d Cir.
1989).
133 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992); Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brew-
ing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Original Appalachian Artworks v. Topps Chewing
Gum, 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga 1986).
114See Hi-Tech Video Productions, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 950
(W.D. Mich. 1992).
135510 U.S. 569 (1994). As the Court stated:
Sony itself called for no hard evidentiary presumption. There, we emphasized the
need for a "sensitive balancing of interests," 464 U.S. at 455, n.40, noted that Con-
gress had "eschewed a rigid, bright-line approach to fair use," id., at 449, n.3 1, and
stated that the commercial or nonprofit educational character of a work is "not con-
clusive," id., at 448-449, but rather a fact to be "weighed along with other[s] in fair
use decisions," id., at 449, n.32 (quoting House Report, p. 66). The Court of Ap-
peals's elevation of one sentence from Sony to a per se rule thus runs as much
counter to Sony itself as to the long common-law tradition of fair use adjudication.
Id. at 584-85.
136 Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified at
17 U.S.C. §§ 1001 - 1010).
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defense, and that the burden of proof on the issue of potential harm
lies with the defendant.137 Finally, in Campbell, the Court acknowl-
edged the importance to the fair use inquiry of a distinction between
productive and unproductive uses. Citing Blackmun's Sony dissent,
Justice Souter wrote:
The goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is gener-
ally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such
works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of
breathing space within the confines of copyright .... and the
more transformative the new work, the less will be the signifi-
cance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh
against a finding of fair use. 1
38
Thus, the fair use principles for which the Sony case is known have
largely been abandoned, and the real estate it takes up in the fair use
chapters of copyright casebooks has dwindled accordingly. Fair use
law today is much closer to something Justice Blackmun might have
recognized with approval.
The Court's holding on liability for contributory infringement, in
contrast, is still very much with us. Networked digital technology has
supplied myriad new ways for consumers to make unauthorized cop-
ies, and whether and under what circumstances the purveyors of tech-
nology that makes infringement easier should be held liable is one of
the most important questions facing the copyright law. The producers
of computers, CD and DVD recorders, digital video recorders and
MP3 players, the providers of Internet services and the designers of
peer-to-peer file sharing software supply products and services that
both facilitate copyright infringement and have substantial legitimate
uses. What Sony means for third party liability is very much in dis-
pute.
'37 See Sony, 510 U.S. at 591-92. Professor Glynn Lunney attributes the reversal of course
to poor lawyering on the part of Campbell's counsel, who conceded that he bore the burden of
proof without even mentioning that Sony had held that the burden should be born by plaintiff.
See Glynn S. Lunney Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U.L. REV. 975,
989 n.70 (2002). Professor Lunney suggests that because the burden of proof issue was not
contested, Campbell's characterization of fair use as an affirmative defense as nonbinding dicta.
Id.
'3s 510 U.S. at 579.
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V. THE "MAGNA CARTA" OF THE TECHNOLOGY AGE
King John had no intention of honouring Magna Carta, as it
was sealed under extortion by force, and clause 61 essentially
neutered his powers as a monarch, making him King in name
only. He renounced it as soon as the barons left London,
plunging England into a civil war, known as the First Barons'
War. Pope Innocent III also immediately annulled the
"shameful and demeaning agreement, forced upon the king
by violence and fear."
-Wikipedia 139
Historians remind us that the significance of the Magna Carta was
more symbolic than practical: The English King neither respected nor
complied with it. 140 So, too, with what the Home Recording Rights
Coalition calls the Magna Carta of the Technology Age. Briefs filed
in the Grokster case argue that the Sony decision has protected inno-
vators from overreaching, litigious copyright owners. 141 If that's so,
it's hard to argue that the case has done an especially effective job.
As new technologies appear, copyright owners have relied on their
factual differences from the Betamax to justify filing a lawsuit. Digi-
tal audio tape recorders, 142 portable MP3 players, 143 and digital video
recorders'" attracted litigation. Sony did not control, it was said, be-
cause they are digital rather than analog. 145 RecordTV.com,' 46 and
Scour.com 147 attracted litigation. Sony did not apply, plaintiffs
claimed, because RecordTV and Scour were networked rather than
confined within the home. 148  Netcom 149 and MP3Board.com150 at-
139 Magna Carta, WIKIPEDIA, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MagnaCarta.
140 See, e.g., THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 22-
26 (5th ed. 1956).
141 See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of the Computer & Communications Industry Association
et. al. in opposition to Petition for Certiorari, MGM v. Grokster, cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 686
(Dec. 10, 2004) (No. 04-480) (filed November 8, 2004).
14 2 See Cahn v. Sony Corp., No. 90 Civ. 4537 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 9, 1990). See generally
Lutzker, supra note 16.
14 3 See RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia, 29 F. Supp. 2d 624 (C.D. Cal. 1998), affd 180 F.3d
1072, (9th Cir. 1999).
144 See MPAA v. Replay TV, Civ. No. 01-09801 (C.D. Cal. filed November 14, 2001)
145 See Lutzker, supra note 16, at 166.
146 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. RecordTV, NO. (C.D.Cal.), filed June 15, 2000; JESSICA
LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 162 (2001).
1
4 7 See Twentieth Century Fox Film, Inc. v. Scour, Inc., No. 00 Civ , (S.D. N.Y. filed July
20, 2000); LITMAN, supra note 146 at 160-66.
148 See, e.g, Press Release, Motion Picture Association of America, Scour Press Release:
Questions and Answers, July 20, 2000 at http://www.mpaa.org/Press/ScourQandA.htm:
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tracted litigation; Sony did not shield them because of allegations that
they knew, or ultimately became aware, of consumers' infringing uses
of their facilities.
In some of these cases, an argument that defendant's technology
was not infringing because it was capable of substantial and commer-
cially significant non-infringing uses might ultimately have carried
the day. Litigation is expensive, however, and angry copyright own-
ers have very deep pockets. RecordTV and Scour.com folded their
tents rather than continue ruinous litigation. SonicBlue, which had
prevailed in the recording industry's suit against its Rio MP3 player,
was unable to survive the motion picture industry's suit against its
ReplayTV.
Some of the distributors of peer-to-peer file sharing software,
however, found the money to take the Sony defense into the court-
room. Peer-to-peer file sharing poses issues that are startlingly remi-
niscent of those raised in Sony. Consumers use peer-to-peer file shar-
ing networks to make unauthorized copies in their homes for their
own personal, consumptive use. If making those copies violates the
copyright law, then enforcing the law implicates the same privacy
concerns that Justice Stevens raised in arguing that Congress had not
intended to prohibit home videotaping. The copying is non-
commercial in the same sense that home Betamax recordings were
non-commercial. 151  As was true in Sony, there already is an enor-
mous installed base of ordinary consumers using the technology. By
the time the Sony case was first argued in the Supreme Court, Sony
claimed to have sold 5 million Betamax recorders to American con-
sumers. Current estimates of the number of peer-to-peer file sharers
within the United States range from 40 to 60 million American con-
sumers. A number of copyright owners have authorized the exchange
of material they own over peer-to-peer networks. Some peer-to-peer
From a purely utilitarian point of view, the technologies are different because VCRs
were too slow and cumbersome and mass distribution of bootlegs too difficult to
make piracy a threat to artists and the industry. However, with Scour.com, hundreds
of millions of copies can be made and distributed as fast as available bandwidth al-
lows.
Id.; Steven Bonisteel, Hollywood Ejects RecordTV in Lawsuit Settlement, NEWSBYTES, April
17, 2001 (available on LEXIS).
149 See Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, 907 F.
Supp. 1361 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
155See Arista Records v, MP3Board.com, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16165; Copy. L. Rep.
(CCH) P28,483 (S.D. N.Y. 2002); LITMAN, supra note 146 at 160-66 (2001).
151 But see A & M v. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd, 239 F.3d
1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding Napster use commercial because "Napster users get for free some-
thing they would ordinarily have to buy").
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file sharing is probably fair use, although the proportion of fair to
infringing uses is the subject of passionate dispute. Other material
transmitted over peer-to-peer is in the public domain. Studies at-
tempting to measure whether and how much harm peer-to-peer file
sharing causes to both actual and potential markets for recorded mu-
sic have reached equivocal and conflicting results.1 52 The owners of
music copyrights have recently begun to release digital copies of their
works in a variety of different copy-protected formats, none of them
compatible with one another, and see peer-to-peer file trading as a
threat to plans to persuade the public to invest in copy-protected digi-
tal music, much as the videocassette recorder appeared to threaten the
market for laser discs.
Of course, there are also significant differences. It would be diffi-
cult to characterize the transmission of files among 40 to 60 million
consumers as "private," and little of the material consumers exchange
is programming they have been invited to view free of charge. Fur-
ther, the economics of data storage suggest that consumers retain un-
authorized peer-to-peer copies more often than they overwrite them.
Most consumers engaged in peer-to-peer file sharing are building
music libraries rather than timeshifting. It is nonetheless clear that
peer-to-peer file sharing software is capable of substantial non-
infringing uses, and that at least one of those uses-authorized peer-
to-peer distribution-is commercially significant. Under the Sony
standard, then, even if the overwhelming majority of peer-to-peer file
sharing in fact infringes copyright, holding the purveyors of the tech-
nology contributorily liable for individual consumers' infringement,
solely on the basis of their dissemination of a technology with sub-
stantial non-infringing uses, is deeply problematic.
Many of the claims being made in litigation over peer-to-peer file
sharing are eerily similar to claims that were raised and rejected in the
course of the Sony litigation. 153 Record companies argue that design-
152 Compare Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record
Sales: An Empirical Analysis (March 2004), available at
http://Www.unc.edu/-cigar/papers/FileSharing-March2004.pdf (concluding that file sharing
does not reduce and may increase sales), with Stan J. Liebowitz, Pitfalls in Measuring the Im-
pact of File Sharing (Oct. 13, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=583484 (concluding that file sharing harms
the sound recording industry). See also LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 68-73 (2004).
153 In Sony, for example, the motion picture studios' summary of argument explained:
Even if it were proper in a copyright case to analogize to the staple article doctrine,
that doctrine would not absolve petitioners of liability here. The staple article theory
shields the seller of a staple article from contributory infringement liability only if (a)
the seller does not actively cause, urge, encourage or aid purchasers to use the article
for infringing purposes, and (b) the article is suitable and actually used for substan-
tial non-infringing uses. The uncontroverted evidence and the district court's findings
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ers and distributors of peer to peer file sharing software should be
held liable because they declined to design their software to block file
sharing without the permission of the copyright owners. 54  In Sony,
the studios argued unsuccessfully that Sony should be required to
incorporate a jammer into the Betamax to prevent unauthorized re-
cording. 55 The plaintiffs in peer-to-peer file sharing cases claim that
peer-to-peer file sharing software distributors have built their business
around theft of copyrighted material;156 the studios in Sony made the
same argument. 57 The recording and motion picture industry accuse
the distributors of peer to peer file sharing software of actively induc-
ing copyright infringement; 58 in Sony, the studios pointed to Betamax
establish both that petitioners cause, urge, encourage and aid infringing VTR copy-
ing and that VTRs do not have actual, substantial non-infringing uses.
Brief of Respondent, Universal City Studios, Inc. and Walt Disney Productions at 20, Sony
Corp. of Am. V. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (No. 81-1687) (emphasis
added). The motion picture stuidos' brief in Grokster summarizes its argument thus:
Although Sony-Betamax provides a defense to contributory infringement where the
defendant sells a staple article of commerce that may be used to infringe but also has
commercially significant noninfringing uses, 464 U.S. at 442, Grokster and Stream-
Cast cannot avail themselves of that defense, for two independent reasons.
First, Sony-Betamax provides no safe harbor where, as here, a defendant engages in
conduct that encourages or assists infringement, or intends to facilitate it. Immuniz-
ing such conduct would be impossible to square with fundamental principles of
copyright and patent law on which the Court relied in Sony-Betamax. ... Second, and
in all events, the Grokster and StreamCast services lack "commercially significant
noninfringing uses.
Brief for Motion Picture Studio and Recording Company Petitioners at 18, MGM Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 2004) (No. 04-480). I am indebted
to Fred von Lohmann for bringing several of these specific instances to my attention.
14See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Brief for Motion
Picture Studio and Recording Company Petitioners at 32-33, MGM Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., cert.
granted 125 S.Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 2004) (No. 04-480); Brief for Songwriter and Music Publisher
Petitioners at 15-16, MGM Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., cert. granted 125 S. Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 2004)
(No. 04-480).
155 See supra note 30 and accompanying text; Brief of Respondents, Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc. and Walt Disney Productions at 12 n.4, Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (No. 81-1687) ("[Alfter learning of a technological system which
would prevent VTR copying of copyrighted programs, Sony immediately studied and discov-
ered a method of overcoming this system and objected to introduction of evidence of the system
at trial.").
156See, e.g., Brief for Motion Picture Studios and Recording Company Petitioners at 6,
MGM Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 2004) (No. 04-480); Brief
for Songwriter and Music Publisher Petitioners at 10-13, MGM Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, cert.
granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 2004) (No. 04-480).
157 See Brief of Respondents, Universal City Studios, Inc. and Walt Disney Productions at
40, Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (No. 81-1687)
("[R]eproduction of copyrighted materials is the most conspicuous use of Betamax and is the
use intended, expected and encouraged by petitioners.").
158 See Brief for Motion Picture Studios and Recording Company Petitioners at 27-29,
MGM Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 2004) (No. 04-480).
THE SONY PARADOX
ads, brochures and instruction manuals that they claimed encouraged
consumers to infringe their copyrights.' 59 In the peer-to-peer file
sharing cases, plaintiffs argue that peer to peer file sharing software
would not be commercially viable if it didn't facilitate massive copy-
right infringement;16 in Sony, the studios insisted "there would be
little, if any, market for VTRs if they could not be used for infringing
purposes."1 6 1 In the current cases, plaintiffs insist that only a minis-
cule fraction of the copying taking place is authorized. 62 In Sony the
plaintiffs argued that less than 9% of home video recording involved
programs of the type that might be copied without their owner's ob-
jecting. 161
The first peer-to-peer file sharing defendant to argue that it was not
liable for contributory infringement because its file-sharing network
was capable of substantial non-infringing use was Napster. The Ninth
Circuit read Sony narrowly, construing the staple article of commerce
doctrine to preclude the imposition of constructive knowledge, but to
permit the imposition of liability when the evidence demonstrated
actual knowledge of direct infringement.164 Even so narrowed, the
defense arguably shielded Napster from some liability, the court
ruled, and the district court had erred in ruling that Sony did not apply
to Napster at all. The Ninth Circuit remanded the issue for trial165-a
trial that never took place because Napster ran out of money. The
Sony defense was next invoked by the already-bankrupt Aimster. The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Ninth
Circuit's construction of Sony lacked textual support. Judge Posner
read Sony to apply even where the alleged contributory infringer is
19 See Brief of Respondents, Universal City Studios, Inc. and Walt Disney Productions
at 20, Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (No. 81-
1687) ("[Pletitioners actively encourage such infringing activity through their advertisements,
brochures and instruction manuals.").
160 See Brief for Motion Picture Studio and Recording Company Petitioners at 30-36,
MGM Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., cert. granted, cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 2004) (No.
04-480).
161 Brief of Respondents, Universal City Studios, Inc. and Walt Disney Productions at 50,
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (No. 81-1687).
162 See Brief for Motion Picture Studio and Recording Company Petitioners at 36-37,
MGM Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 2004) (No. 04-480).
163 See Brief of Respondents, Universal City Studios, Inc. and Walt Disney Productions at
48 n. 113, Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (No. 81-1687)("[L]ess than 9% of all recordings consists of... the type of material purportedly owned by
most of the limited number of witnesses who testified that they did not object to VTR copy-
ing.").
14A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2001).
65MId. at 1021 ("We depart from the reasoning of the district court that Napster failed to
demonstrate that its system is capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses .... The
district court improperly confined the use analysis to current uses, ignoring the system's capa-
bilities.").
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aware of its customers' direct infringement. The Sony court, Judge
Posner suggested, found it inappropriate to impose infringement li-
ability on the supplier of a new technology "at the price of possibly
denying non-infringing consumers the benefit of the technology."'
' 66
In order to assess whether the supplier of a product or service used for
copyright infringement should be liable for that infringement, he con-
tinued, a court must estimate the respective magnitude of infringing
and non-infringing uses. The mere possibility of a substantial non-
infringing use should not shield a defendant from contributory liabil-
ity. Rather, the court concluded, Sony called for a comparison of the
size and the probability of infringing and non-infringing uses, and
allowed the imposition of contributory liability on a peer-to-peer file
sharing service when the legitimate uses of the service were out-
weighed by the infringing ones.
167
In MGM v. Grokster, the defendants persuaded the trial court that
Sony absolved them of liability for contributory infringment1 68 The
Court of Appeals agreed, concluding that "the district court correctly
applied applicable law and properly declined the invitation to alterit,,169
The introduction of new technology is always disruptive to
old markets, and particularly to those copyright owners
whose works are sold through well established distribution
mechanisms. Yet, history has shown that time and market
forces often provide equilibrium in balancing interests,
whether the new technology be a player piano, a copier, a
tape recorder, a video recorder, a personal computer, a kara-
oke machine, or an MP3 player. Thus, it is prudent for courts
to exercise caution before restructuring liability theories for
the purpose of addressing specific market abuses, despite
their apparent present magnitude.
170
To many in the copyright bar, Grokster's success confirms their
initial view that Sony was wrongly decided in the first place. The
grant of certiorari in the Grokster case offers them some hope that
this time the Court will appreciate the incalculable damage done to
166 In re Aimster Copyright Litig, 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2003).
16 7 1d. at 650-53 (noting that there was no evidence in the record of any actual non-
infringing use, and that all of defendant's promotional material encouraged uses that infringed
copyrights).
168 MGM Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1035 (C.D. Cal. 2003), aff'd, 380
F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 2004).
169 380 F.3d at 1167.
170 Id. at 1167.
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copyright when consumers make their own unauthorized copies, and
will replace the Sony standard with something more solicitous of
copyright ownership. Defenders of Sony fear that Sony's detractors
may be right about that. Some of them urged the Court to decline
certiorari,1 7 1 and are now urging the Court to reaffirm the standard it
announced 20 years earlier. 72
In the current overheated environment, an assertion that losing
Sony might not be as costly as we claim is likely to be received as an
disingenuous sign of support for Hollywood's most egregious legal
overreaching. I'm nonetheless going to risk suggesting that when we
examine what we're afraid we'll lose in the Grokster reformulation,
we may find that we've lost much of it already. If we fear losing
what some have called Sony's "clear standard" on third-party liabil-
ity, 73 I suggest that that the rule of Sony has not been clear at all in
practice. A clearer "clear standard" may offer emerging technology a
more reliable shelter; a muddier standard could hardly threaten them
with more uncertainty than they face today.
If, on the other hand, we're afraid of losing a favorite wisp of
copyright law doctrine, I'd suggest that a hard look may reveal that
most of the doctrines we're worried about losing are those that we've
all but lost already. Sony's fair use holdings, as I discussed earlier,
are only barely with us. In particular, private copying is no longer
widely viewed as fair use. Sony upheld the right of consumers to
make private, consumptive copies. That right, as Justice Stevens's
opinion in Sony articulated it, arguably shelters consumers who en-
gage in peer-to-peer file sharing. 74 In addition, section 1008 of the
copyright statute, enacted against the background of Sony's fair use
standard, provides a colorable defense to consumers who download
files over peer-to-peer networks. 75  Yet, despite the plausibility of
171 See, e.g., Brief of Computer and Communications Industry Association and Internet
Archive in Support of Respondents in Opposition to the Writ of Certiorari, MGM Inc. v. Grok-
ster, Ltd., cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 2004) (No. 04-480).
172 See, e.g., Brief of Intel Corporation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, MGM
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 2004) (No. 04-480).
173 See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
174 The peer-to-peer copying is noncommercial and thus presumptively fair use except to
the extent that copyright owners are able to show that it adversely affects their potential market.
Studies purporting to ascertain the extent to which peer-to-peer file sharing causes harm have
reached equivocal and conflicting results. Compare Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The
Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis (March 2004), available at
http://www.unc.edu/-cigar/papers/FileSharing-March2004.pdf (concluding that file sharing
does not reduce sales but may increase them), with Stan J. Liebowitz, Pitfalls in Measuring the
Impact of File Sharing (July 2004) available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=583484 (concluding that file sharing harms
the sound recording industry), See also LESSIG, supra note 152, at 68-73.
'
75 See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000); Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
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legal arguments permitting consumers to make as many personal cop-
ies as they desire, counsel for Streamcast and Grokster apparently
made the strategic decision not to use them. Moreover, only one of
the 8000 consumers sued so far for peer-to-peer file sharing by the
recording industry has found the arguments in favor of personal copy-
ing sufficiently compelling to be worth the risk of taking the law suit
to trial, and she lost on summary judgment. 176 If the arguments in
favor of personal copying seem so unappealing that litigants decline
to make them, it's hard to argue that they remain alive in any but the
most formal sense.
17 7
What about the Sony majority's solicitude for consumer privacy?
Doesn't the Sony case, by allowing businesses to market technology
that has both infringing and noninfringing use, establish core free-
doms necessary to what Professor Julie Cohen has termed "intellec-
tual privacy?"'178 That battle, unfortunately, also seems all but lost.
As recently as ten years ago, we may have been able to structure our
copyright law to avoid deployment of the copyright police. 79 Today,
the copyright police are out in force, searching consumers' hard disks
for evidence of unauthorized copies, lurking on the Internet disguised
as popular downloads, securing works with digital combination locks,
recording eye tracks, and listing authorized ears. Justice Stevens's
specter of massive invasions of consumer privacy by the copyright
police attempting to enforce the copyright statute against millions of
21st Century William Griffithses has become very real. The recording
and motion picture industries have sued thousands of individual con-
sumers based upon the files they have stored on their personal com-
puters.
That still leaves Sony's core holding, that the producer of a staple
article of commerce is not liable for contributory infringement merely
for making, selling, or distributing a copying device if that device is
capable of substantial or commercially significant non-infringing use.
As I discussed earlier, that principle has offered dtibious protection to
the developers of devices capable of substantial non-infringing uses,
since copyright owners have sued many of them into bankruptcy be-
L.J. 337, 357-360 (2002) (examining whether statute shields consumers from liability).
176 See BMG Music v. Gonzalez, No. 03-C-6276, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 910, at *5 (N.D.
Il. Jan. 7, 2005) (granting summary judgment to plaintiff recording companies).
177 But see Lunney, supra note 137, at 989 n. 70.
178 See Julie E. Cohen, DRM & Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575 (2003); Julie E.
Cohen, Intellectual Privacy and Censorship of the Internet, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 693
(1998).




fore they could mount a Sony-based defense. In the rare cases in
which a defense based on Sony made it into the courtroom, most
courts read it restrictively, adopting narrowing constructions that en-
abled them to impose liability on the purveyors of technology that
was unquestionably capable of substantial non-infringing uses. 80
In the past 21 years, Congress has expanded copyright to the point
that it is difficult for anyone to navigate the course of an ordinary day
without committing multiple potential infringements. We have be-
come dependent upon computers, which copy promiscuously in the
course of ordinary operations. Our computers and our telephones and
televisions are now connected to networks and regularly transmit files
"beyond the place from which they are sent," performing and display-
ing works and arguably doing so "publicly." Yet our copyright stat-
ute still reckons liability without attention to intent or fault, and still
imposes substantial damages for even inadvertent infringement.
Copyright owners have resisted proposals to limit the scope of secon-
dary liability by statute.18' Despite all the provisions Congress has
added to the copyright statute in the past twenty-one years, it has so
far failed to address the Sony standard for contributory liability except
to enact limited safe harbors for Internet service providers, 182 and to
add a separate provision imposing liability for on entities who "manu-
facture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in"
technology designed to circumvent technological copy-protection or
access-protection systems. 83 That provision comes equipped with its
own remedies section, reinforcing the claim that the remedies provi-
sions in the current copyright statute make little sense in the context
of contributory infringement based on trafficking in a technology that
makes it easy for consumers to infringe.
Ultimately, the fate of the copyright staple article of commerce
doctrine is likely to be a congressional call. A respected copyright
scholar with ties to the lobbying community told me recently that
copyright lobbies are gearing up for action in the event the Supreme
Court decides Grokster the "wrong way." They are determined, he
tells me, to purchase the enactment of the Induce Act' 84 at any cost.
Thus, a Court decision in Grokster's favor will likely be a prelude to
legislation. The current statute, meanwhile, leaves a Court deter-
mined to reverse in Groskter little room to maneuver. The Court
can't simply jettison the staple article of commerce doctrine without
180 See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2003).
181 See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 127-45 (2000).
182 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
183 Id. at § 1201.
184 See supra note I and accompanying text.
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identifying an alternate test to take its place, and the statute is no
more helpful on that point than it was twenty-one years ago.
Defining an appropriate boundary between contributory infringers
and innovators in digital technology seems even more crucial today
than it did when the Court decided Sony. Congress has not stepped in
to articulate a workable line, and its specific, detailed, conditional
provisions on ISP and circumvention liability defy generalization.
Meanwhile, the copyright staple article of commerce doctrine appears
to have achieved acceptance even among members of the copyright
bar. For all that a couple of outlying briefs insist, echoing Justice
Blackmun and Steven Kroft, that copyright and patent are so different
that importing a standard from patent into copyright is sure to cause
mischief, 85 most of the briefs filed in support of the motion picture
industry's appeal suggest that the staple article of commerce doctrine
has broad, if sometimes grudging support.'
86
CONCLUSION
Sony has talismanic meaning in the community of high tech copy-
right lawyers, but it doesn't live up to its hype. Sony's doctrinal con-
tributions have eroded over time. It has failed to protect innovators
from litigation. At the same time, as copyright owners attempt to
catch ever more people in the net of secondary liability, our need for a
workable rule dividing contributory liability from no liability has be-
come more acute. For all of its limitations, the line drawn by the Sony
case makes more policy sense than any of its competitors. Since the
motion picture industry and the recording industry have overcome
their reluctance to sue thousands of individual consumers directly,
moreover, there's less justification for expanding secondary copyright
liability to give copyright owners "effective-not merely
symbolic-protection..."'87
Ultimately Congress is likely to be asked to rewrite whatever stan-
dard the Court articulates in Grokster. Motion picture studios and
recording companies will likely insist, as they did before the cert.
grant in Groskter, on a rule imposing liability for statutory damages
on any business that profits from infringement. High tech companies
who have supported the legal ruling in Groskter, although not the
185 See Brief of Professors Peter S. Menell, David Nimmer, Robert P. Merges, and
Justin Hughes, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 9-19, MGM Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 2004) (No. 04-480).
186 See e.g., Brief of Business Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioners at 8-12, MGM, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (Dec. 19, 2004)
(No. 04-480).
187 Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
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peer-to-peer file trading defendants facilitate, will likely insist, as they
did last fall, that such a rule be confined in its application to busi-
nesses profiting from unlicensed peer-to-peer file trading. Under
pressure from those industries, Congress is unlikely to draw a new
line of general application that differs significantly from the one
drawn in Sony. Drawing a sensible and robust line of general appli-
cation is a tricky proposition, after all, and would require Congress to
revisit copyright remedies at a fundamental level. Industry lobbyists,
seeking quick fixes to meet their immediate needs, will have little
interest in helping members of Congress to craft one, especially be-
cause securing the enactment of a new general rule for secondary
copyright liability would require broad inter-industry consensus that
the new rule is superior to the current one. Congress, therefore, will
probably do what it has done before: enact a narrow rule that purports
to fix the problem but proves unhelpful within months of enactment
because technology has morphed in unanticipated ways.
That suggests that 20 years from now, the Sony rule will still be
with us, although Congress may by then have carved numerous ex-
ceptions to impose expanded liability under specific rules on people
involved with specific technological innovations. The Sony staple
article of commerce rule may not be the best possible rule, but it
looks more and more as if it is the best plausible rule.
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